Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985)

Petitioners Olga Tellis (Journalist), Pavement Dwellers, People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)

Respondents Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC), State of Maharashtra

Case Type Writ Petition (under Article 32)

Year It Took ~1981 (Eviction drive) - 1985 (Decision)

Judges & Opinions

CJI Y.V. ChandrachudFavored (Authored)
Justice A. VaradarajanFavored
Justice O. Chinnappa ReddyFavored
Justice S. Murtaza Fazal AliFavored
Justice V.D. TulzapurkarFavored

Acts & Sections Used [ 4+ ]

Constitution of India (Articles 19(1)(e), 19(1)(g), 21, 32, 37, 39(a), 41)
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (Section 312, 313, 314)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 115 - Estoppel)

Key Citations [ 3+ ]

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981)
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

This landmark Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed on behalf of pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay (now Mumbai) who were facing eviction by the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) under Section 314 of the BMC Act, 1888. The petitioners argued that eviction without resettlement would deprive them of their livelihood, which they contended was an integral part of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21.

The case raised fundamental questions about the scope of Article 21, the conflict between the right to livelihood and laws against encroachment, and the application of principles like estoppel and natural justice in the context of mass evictions of the urban poor.

ARGUMENTS

Petitioners' Case (Olga Tellis & Pavement Dwellers)

The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, as deprivation of livelihood effectively amounts to deprivation of life.
Evicting pavement dwellers from their place of residence near their place of work, without providing alternatives, violates their right to livelihood and thus Article 21.
The procedure under Section 314 of the BMC Act (allowing removal of encroachments without notice) is arbitrary and violates natural justice, thus not being a "fair, just, and reasonable" procedure as required by Article 21 post-Maneka Gandhi.
The State/BMC should be estopped from evicting them, given past acquiescence or implied permission (like inclusion in electoral rolls, ration cards issued at pavement addresses).

Respondents' Case (BMC & State of Maharashtra)

Pavement dwelling is an illegal encroachment and trespass on public property.
Section 314 of the BMC Act provides a valid procedure for removing obstructions and encroachments from public spaces, which does not necessitate prior notice in all cases.
The right to life does not extend to the right to commit an illegal act (trespass).
Estoppel cannot operate against a statute or prevent the performance of a statutory duty (removing encroachments). Providing housing is a complex policy matter involving resource constraints.

Case Progression Timeline

Eviction Drive Announced

Maharashtra Chief Minister announces plan to demolish pavement dwellings in Bombay and deport dwellers to their places of origin.

~July 1981

Demolitions Begin / Stay Order

BMC starts demolitions. Journalists and PUCL file petitions in the High Court and Supreme Court, obtaining an interim stay.

July 1981

Supreme Court Hearing

A 5-judge bench hears arguments on the fundamental rights of pavement dwellers and the validity of summary eviction procedures.

~1982-1985

Judgment Delivered

SC delivers judgment affirming right to livelihood under Article 21, but upholds validity of Section 314 BMC Act, allowing eviction after procedural fairness.

July 10, 1985

The Supreme Court delivered a unanimous and highly significant judgment, authored by CJI Chandrachud. The Court definitively held that the right to livelihood is an integral part of the Right to Life under Article 21. It reasoned that for the vast majority, the means of livelihood are essential for the bare sustenance of life itself.

However, the Court did not accept that pavement dwellers had an absolute right to encroach on public spaces. It upheld the constitutional validity of Section 314 of the BMC Act, stating that the procedure (summary eviction for obstructions) was not per se unreasonable, given the need to keep public ways clear. Crucially, though, the Court read principles of natural justice into the application of the section, implying that notice or hearing should generally be given unless impractical. The Court rejected the argument of promissory estoppel against the BMC but emphasized the State's duty towards the poor based on Directive Principles. While ultimately allowing the eviction, the Court directed that it be carried out humanely, particularly after the monsoon season, and urged the state to provide alternative sites where possible.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Court's analysis beautifully balanced the expanded scope of Article 21 post-Maneka Gandhi with the practical realities of urban governance and property law. By explicitly linking livelihood to life, it gave constitutional weight to the economic struggles of the poor. Its interpretation of Section 314 demonstrated judicial creativity in reading procedural fairness into a seemingly harsh statutory provision, thus upholding the law while mitigating its potentially unjust application. While rejecting estoppel against the statute, the Court used the opportunity to remind the State of its obligations under Directive Principles (like Article 39(a) - adequate means of livelihood, and Article 41 - right to work). The judgment is a classic example of judicial activism tempered with pragmatism, affirming rights while acknowledging legal and administrative constraints.

FINAL VERDICT

The Right to Livelihood is an essential component of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, authorizing the removal of encroachments without notice, is not per se unconstitutional, but must be applied in a fair and reasonable manner.
Principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) should generally be followed before eviction under Section 314, unless giving notice is impractical.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to permit citizens to live on pavements or public property against statutory provisions.
The eviction of pavement dwellers was permitted but directed to be carried out humanely, after the monsoon, with efforts towards providing alternative pitches where feasible.
The Writ Petitions were partly allowed to the extent of affirming the right to livelihood and reading procedural safeguards into the Act.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Right to Life under Article 21 includes the Right to Livelihood because no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. Deprivation of livelihood, except according to a just, fair, and reasonable procedure established by law, can tantamount to deprivation of life. Even where a statute (like Section 314 BMC Act) seemingly permits summary action, principles of natural justice must be read into it unless explicitly and reasonably excluded, especially when fundamental rights like livelihood are affected.