- CJI Y.V. ChandrachudFavored (Authored)
- Justice D.A. DesaiFavored
- Justice O. Chinnappa ReddyFavored
- Justice E.S. VenkataramiahFavored
- Justice Ranganath MisraFavored
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 125 - Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents)
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 127(3)(b) - Order alteration on payment received under personal law)
- Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
- Constitution of India (Article 44 - Uniform Civil Code)
- Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia (1979)
- Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali (1980)
This highly debated case involved Shah Bano Begum, a 62-year-old Muslim woman who was divorced by her husband, Mohd. Ahmed Khan, after over 40 years of marriage. He gave her an irrevocable triple talaq and initially paid some maintenance but then refused further support beyond the iddat period (a waiting period post-divorce in Muslim law), arguing that Muslim Personal Law only required payment of mehr (dower) and maintenance during iddat.
Shah Bano filed a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, a secular law applicable to all citizens, which provides for maintenance to wives, children, and parents unable to support themselves. The Magistrate and later the High Court awarded her maintenance. Her husband appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that Section 125 CrPC conflicted with Muslim Personal Law.
ARGUMENTS
Appellant's Case (Mohd. Ahmed Khan)
- Section 125 CrPC does not apply to Muslim husbands regarding divorced wives, as Muslim Personal Law governs this.
- Muslim Personal Law only requires payment of mehr and maintenance during the iddat period (approx. 3 months).
- Section 127(3)(b) CrPC implies that if the wife receives the whole sum due under customary or personal law upon divorce, the maintenance order under Section 125 can be cancelled. Payment of mehr fulfills this condition.
- Applying Section 125 would interfere with Muslim Personal Law.
Respondent's Case (Shah Bano Begum)
- Section 125 CrPC is a secular provision intended to prevent vagrancy and applies to all citizens, including Muslims.
- The provision uses the term "wife," which includes a divorced woman who has not remarried.
- Payment of mehr is not equivalent to future maintenance; it's a consideration for marriage or an amount due on divorce, not a sum payable on divorce in lieu of maintenance.
- There is no conflict between Section 125 and Muslim Personal Law; the CrPC provision provides an additional remedy against destitution.
Case Progression Timeline
Divorce
Mohd. Ahmed Khan divorces Shah Bano Begum by irrevocable triple talaq.
November 1978Maintenance Claim Filed
Shah Bano files a petition under Section 125 CrPC in the Magistrate's Court in Indore seeking maintenance.
April 1978 (Filed before final divorce)Magistrate Orders Maintenance
Judicial Magistrate awards a small amount of maintenance (Rs. 25 per month).
August 1979High Court Enhances Maintenance
On revision, the Madhya Pradesh High Court enhances the maintenance amount to Rs. 179.20 per month.
July 1980Appeal to Supreme Court
Mohd. Ahmed Khan appeals the High Court decision to the Supreme Court.
~1980-1981Supreme Court Judgment
The 5-judge bench unanimously dismisses the appeal, upholding the right of Muslim divorced women to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.
April 23, 1985Muslim Women Act Passed
Following protests against the judgment, Parliament passes the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, largely seen as overturning the SC's application of Sec 125 to Muslim women.
May 19, 1986The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the husband's appeal and upheld the High Court's decision granting maintenance to Shah Bano under Section 125 CrPC. The Court firmly ruled that Section 125 is secular in character and applies to all persons regardless of religion.
It held that the term "wife" includes a divorced wife who hasn't remarried. The Court rejected the argument that payment of mehr absolved the husband of further maintenance obligations under Section 125, interpreting Section 127(3)(b) narrowly. The judgment also famously included an observation regretting that Article 44 (Uniform Civil Code) had remained a "dead letter" and urged the government towards its implementation.
COURT'S ANALYSIS
Chief Justice Chandrachud's judgment focused on the legislative intent behind Section 125 CrPC – preventing destitution and vagrancy, applicable across communities. The Court interpreted the CrPC provisions harmoniously with Muslim Personal Law principles where possible but ultimately asserted the supremacy of the secular criminal procedure code in matters of maintenance intended to prevent social problems. The analysis delved into the meaning of "wife" and the nature of mehr, concluding it wasn't a substitute for post-divorce maintenance under the secular law. The Court's reference to the Uniform Civil Code (Article 44), though an obiter dictum (observation not essential to the decision), ignited widespread debate and political controversy, highlighting the tension between secular law, personal laws, and constitutional directives.
FINAL VERDICT
- The appeal by Mohd. Ahmed Khan was dismissed.
- Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is secular and applies to all persons, including Muslims.
- A divorced Muslim woman, until she remarries, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC from her former husband if she is unable to maintain herself.
- Payment of mehr by the husband does not, by itself, absolve him from the obligation to pay maintenance under Section 125.
- The High Court's order granting maintenance to Shah Bano Begum was upheld.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which provides for maintenance of wives unable to maintain themselves, is a measure of social justice applicable to all women regardless of religion. The term "wife" under Section 125 includes a divorced woman who has not remarried. The payment of an amount (like mehr) under personal law on divorce does not automatically exempt the husband from the liability under Section 125 unless it is considered adequate provision for the wife's future made at the time of divorce, satisfying the conditions under Section 127(3)(b).
(Note: The application of Section 125 CrPC to Muslim women was subsequently altered by the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, though later SC judgments, like Danial Latifi (2001), interpreted this Act to ensure divorced Muslim women receive a "reasonable and fair provision" for the future beyond the iddat period.)